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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1980's a serious crisis developed in the insurance in-
dustry which threatened to expose corporate directors to personal liabil-
ity.1 In addition, in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided in
Smith v. Van Gorkom that directors who failed to adequately inform
themselves of corporate matters were grossly negligent, and therefore
would be held personally liable for their uninformed decisions.' The
decision has been viewed as one of the worst in the history of corporate
law, and one which will adversely affect the quality of directors who
serve on corporate boards.'
In keeping with the flurry in almost every state to amend their
corporate acts in response to the crisis in the Director and Officer in-
surance industry and the Smith v. Van Gorkom decision, in 1987 the
Florida Legislature made sweeping changes to the Florida General
Corporation Act." Specifically, the Legislature added a new statute re-
lating to the personal liability of directors for decisions which they
* The author would like to thank Professor Marilyn Cane for her suggestion of
the title and her assistance generally.
1. A number of commentators have written about the crisis in the director and
officer liability insurance industry. See, e.g., Block, Barton & Garfield, Advising Direc-
tors on the D & 0 Insurance Crisis, 14 SEc. REG. L.J. 130 (1985); Note, New York's
Response to the Director and Officer Liability Crisis: A Need to Reexamine the Im-
portance of D & 0 Insurance, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1305 (1989).
2. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
3. See Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 708. After the Van Gorkom decision, numerous com-
mentators have discussed its repercussions. See, e.g., Animashaun, The Business Judg-
ment Rule: Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 16 S.U.L. REV.
345 (1989); Titus, Limiting Directors' Liability: The Case for a More Balanced Ap-
proach - The Corporate Governance Project Alternative, 11 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 1
(1989); Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A Proposal for Legislative Re-
form, 66 TEX. L. Rav. 411 (1987); Note, Corporate Directors - An Endangered Spe-
cies? A More Reasonable Standard For Director and Officer Liability in Illinois, 1987
U. ILL. L. REV. 495 (1987).
4. FLA. STAT. § 607 (1986)(repealed 1989, and reenacted as Florida Business
Corporation Act FLA. STAT. § 607 (1989 & Supp. 1990)).
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make in their capacity as directors." Rather than follow the lead of the
Delaware Legislature, which allowed corporations to limit or eliminate
liability of directors in their charters,6 the Florida Legislature took a
different approach. The lawmakers decided to grant directors immunity
from personal liability for money damages in respect to "any state-
ment, vote, decision, or failure to act, regarding corporate management
or policy," unless there is a breach of duty by the director and the
breach constitutes one of five circumstances.' Whereas the Delaware
amendment sought to protect informed shareholders by giving them the
choice of deciding whether or not to relieve their directors of liability,
the Florida Legislature took choice out of the hands of the shareholder.
In effect, the Florida statute relieves directors of accountability for
their actions except in the most grievous circumstances, and indeed,
reduces the rights of shareholders.
The 1987 amendment had two stated legislative purposes. The first
was to reduce the concerns of directors to the possibility of being per-
sonally liable for damages arising out of decisions they make in their
capacity as directors.8 The second was to define more clearly the stan-
dard of care owed to the corporation and the shareholders by the direc-
tor.' In order to satisfy the stated legislative purpose of making direc-
tors' jobs less worrisome, and to attract high calibre directors, the
legislature also modified the provisions with regard to indemnification.
These provisions were altered to increase the circumstances in which
directors may be indemnified where they are found liable for acts taken
on behalf of the corporation. 10
The approach of the Florida Legislature in amending its corpora-
tion statute has bqen described as "[t]he most radical legislative ap-
proach to director liability [as it directly alters] the standard of liabil-
ity necessary to recover money damages from directors." ' :, Moreover,
one commentator noted that the 1987 amendment so dilutes a share-
5. FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (1989). This amendment will be referred to in this
paper as "the 1987 amendment."
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(Supp. 1989).
7. § 607.0831; See infra Part II
8. Act approved June 30, 1987 ch. 245 § 1(1), 1987 Fla. Law;; 1685.
9. Id. at § 1(2). Quoted in full infra Part II.
10. The indemnification provisions can be found at § 607.0850. The new provi-
sions are at §§ 607.0850(2) and (7).
11. Changes in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act - Amendment Per-
taining to the Liability of Directors, 45 Bus. LAW. 695, 698 (1990) [hereinafter
Changes].
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holder's right of action against a director for money damages that its
constitutionality may be in doubt.' 2 Whereas some thirty five states
have already amended their corporation acts to provide for a lower
standard of culpability, only five other states have enacted such obvi-
ously pro-director legislation similar to Florida.13
The 1987 amendment has the effect of reducing the concerns
which directors have regarding their personal liability, but other ques-
tions remain. The statute clarifies the appropriate standard of care
owed by the director to the corporation and its shareholders only in so
far as it generally eliminates liability for monetary damages. However,
directors must continue to be concerned with the standard of care since
they may still be restrained from action by injunction or their actions
may be subject to rescission by the court.14 Nevertheless, because the
burden on the shareholder seeking to obtain equitable relief is so great,
directors probably have no real need to be concerned. This Note con-
siders the present state of the law relating to liability of directors in
Florida, and considers whether the new legislative changes can or will
have the intended effect. Part II analyzes the legislative changes, de-
scribes in detail the provisions of section 607.0831 and considers how
the new provisions differ from the state of the law prior to 1987. Part
III examines the policy considerations in determining the parameters of
director liability, and focuses particularly on the part that the director
and officer liability insurance industry played in effecting the legislative
change. Part IV considers what effect, if any, the statutory changes can
or will have on corporations and their directors, and concludes that
thus far, the positive effects anticipated by the legislature have not
occurred.
12. See McGuigan, Legislative Developments in Director's Liability Ch. 87-245,
FLA. B.J. 41, 43 (1987)(discussing the constitutionality of the 1987 amendment and
concluding that it is probably constitutional).
13. The other states adopting Florida's approach are Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §
23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1990), Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp.
1989), Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C) (Anderson Supp. 1990), Virginia,
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1990) and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.307
(West Supp. 1989). These states have adopted the approach of setting out the standard
of care required of directors before they may be fixed with liability. See generally
Oesterle, The Effect of Statutes Limiting Directors' Due Care Liability of Hostile
Takeover Defenses, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 31 (1989).
14. McGuigan, supra note 12, at 42.
1991] 1391
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II. THE 1987 AMENDMENT
In making the "radical" amendment to the Florida Corporation
Act, the Legislature found
that the service of qualified persons on the governing boards of cor-
porations, . . . is in the public interest and that within reasonable
limitations, such persons should be permitted to perform without
undue concern for the possibility of litigation arising from the dis-
charge of their duties as policy makers. The Legislature further
finds that the case law of the state does not adequately delineate
the liability of those serving on governing boards, and that such
delineations through the clarification of the appropriate standard of
care due an individual and a corporation by a member of a gov-
erning board is essential in encouraging the continued service of
qualified persons on such governing boards. 15
In the Staff Analysis of the House of Representatives, Committee
on the Judiciary, it was noted that Florida case law had not y~t defined
the "parameters of liability of a director of a corporation . . . in this
state."16 The House Analysis went on to find that the state of the law
was such that it was foreseeable that a director could be held person-
ally liable where he failed to take "all reasonable and necessary pre-
cautions to ensure that any action [which] he took as a director would
not result in damage to another." 17 Under these circumstances, the
committee recommended that the law should be changed to define
more clearly the standards to which directors should be held. 8 The
Senate Committee pinpointed two main reasons why the need for the
change arose: the need to make the position of director attractive in
order to encourage corporations to incorporate in Florida; and the diffi-
culty of obtaining director and officer liability insurance.' 9
This part examines the provisions of the 1987 amendment. A dis-
cussion of the state of the law regarding the personal liability of direc-
tors in 1987 puts in context the reason the position of director may
have been unattractive at that time.
15. Act approved June 30, 1987, ch. 245 § 1(2), 1987 Fla. Laws 1685.
16. FLA. H.R., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STAFF ANALYSIS at I (1987)[hereinaf-
ter HOUSE ANALYSIS].
17. Id.
18. For the proposals of the House Committee see id. at 2-5.
19. See FLA. SENATE, STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT at 7-
8 (1987) [hereinafter SENATE ANALYSIS].
1392 [Vol. 15
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A. The Provisions of the 1987 Amendment
Section 607.0831 of the Florida Statutes eliminates director liabil-
ity for monetary damages except in five defined circumstances. Rather
than outlining the standards by which directors should be guided, the
statute virtually eliminates director liability for monetary damages, and
restates the law regarding the acts for which director liability may still
attach. Furthermore, the statute requires a two-step test before liability
may be established.2 0 The first and threshold requirement is that the
director must have breached or failed to perform his duties as a direc-
tor.2 1 The second step is that the breach must also constitute: 1) a vio-
lation of criminal law, unless the director had reasonable cause to be-
lieve that his act was lawful or no reasonable cause to believe it was
unlawful; or 2) a transaction from which the director derived a per-
sonal benefit; or 3) the director has voted or assented to an unlawful
distribution and is liable pursuant to section 607.0834; or 4) conscious
disregard for the best interest of the corporation, or wilful misconduct
in any derivative action or other action by or against the corporation;
or 5) recklessness or any act or omission which was committed in bad
faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and
wilful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.22
The first step of the 1987 amendment neither ch nges nor clarifies
the standard of care of directors as it refers to duties which it does not
define. 3 However, the real meat of the statute is the second step, for
even if the court finds a breach of duty, it must still find one of the five
violations for any liability for monetary damages to attach. The five
exceptions encompass such improper conduct, "so clearly without any
societal benefit," that under no circumstances should society validate
it.24
B. The Duties of Directors
Since the 1987 amendment does not define the "duties" which the
director must breach in order to attract liability, the common law du-
ties of care and loyalty, and the standards as previously codified under
20. See McGuigan, supra note 12, at 42.
21. § 607.0831(1)(a).
22. § 607.0831(1).
23. § 607.0830 outlines general standards in codifying the business judgment
rule. See also infra Part II, section C.
24. Changes, supra note 11, at 701.
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sections 607.0830 and 607.0832 must be examined to determine
whether there has been a breach of duty.
Historically, courts have wrestled with the type of duty owed by
directors to the corporations they serve. 5 The Florida Supreme Court
noted in 1932 that "[w]hile directors of a corporation may not be in
the strict sense trustees, it is well established by the decisions that they
occupy a quasi-fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockhold-
ers."2 6 The present state of the law is that directors owe the twin duties
of care and loyalty to the shareholders and the corporation in managing
and administering the corporation's property, assets and affairs.17 Di-
rectors must act with fidelity and in good faith when discharging their
functions.2"
In discharging his duties, a director must act with ordinary care
and skill.29 Even though the director may delegate his authority in the
active management of the business to officers, he must still exercise
reasonable supervision." Directors have a "continuing obligation to
keep informed about the activities of the corporation,"'" and if they do
not, they cannot set up a defense of lack of knowledge needed to exer-
cise the requisite degree of care.32 Indeed, "[a] director is not an orna-
ment, but an essential component of corporate governance. Conse-
quently, a director cannot protect himself behind a paper shield bearing
the motto 'dummy director.' "I' The director owes a duty to the share-
holders to exercise "supervision and control over the policies and prac-
tices of the corporation." 34
The duty of loyalty prohibits faithlessness and self dealing, includ-
25. See, e.g., Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (1742)(the court
found that directors were trustees and required them to act "with fidelity and due
diligence"); see also Note, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of
Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 605 (1987)(for a more
detailed discussion of the history of the duty of directors).
26. Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 313, 144 So. 674, 677
(1932) (quoting 7 R.C.L. 456, 457).
27. Note, Corporate Directors-An Endangered Species?, supra note 3, at 497.
28. Everdell v. Preston, 717 F. Supp. 1498, 1501 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
29. Skinner v. Hulsey, 103 Fla. 713, 720, 138 So. 769, 772 (1931).
30. See id.
31. Francis v. United Jersey Bank 87 N.J. 15, -, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (1981)
(citing Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J.Eq. 396, 416, 50 A. 120 (Ch. 1901)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at , 432 A.2d at 823 (citing Campbell, 62 N.J.Eq. at 415, 50 A.
120).
34. Id. at , 432 A.2d at 824.
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ing fraud and bad faith. The duty is based on the rationale that the
director, by virtue of his office, owes allegiance to the corporation and
therefore the best interest of the corporation must prevail over his
own.35 However, a director is not absolutely precluded from entering
into transactions in which he may be personally interested and which
arise as a result of his relationship with the corporation. 6 At common
law, transactions between a corporate director and an outsider which
resulted from the director's office were voidable without regard to the
fairness of the transaction.37 The Florida statute now provides that the
transaction is not void or voidable if the relationship is disclosed or is
known to the directors or the shareholders.3 8
C. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is a policy of judicial restraint, which
recognizes that directors are more qualified than judges to make busi-
ness decisions. 39 The rule provides that, for matters that the law vests
in the board, the board has wide discretion and a court will not gener-
ally substitute its judgment for that of the directors.40 Thus, absent any
wrong doing, the court will generally not scrutinize the decisions of a
board to determine the merits of its decision. 4 Traditionally, directors
have always been protected by the "business judgment rule." '42 A direc-
tor who acted with care and loyalty was not subject to any personal
liability.43
The rule is rooted in the notion that in exchange for the confidence
and trust which shareholders place in them, directors must act in good
faith, and "in accepting the office they impliedly undertake to give the
enterprise the benefit of their best care and judgment, and to exercise
35. Animashaun, supra note 3, at 350.
36. See e.g., Procacci v. Soloman 317 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975)(director who purchased corporation's property from bank, after corporation de-
faulted on promissory note, found not liable for breach of fiduciary duty).
37. See Animashaun, supra note 3, at 350.
38. § 607.0832.
39. See, e.g., International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 & n.20 (11 th
Cir. 1989) (applying Florida law, and reviewing decisions involving the business judg-
ment rule).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1458-59.
43. Id.
1991] 1395
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the powers conferred solely in the interest of the corporation."'44 In-
deed, equity has always held them liable as trustees. 45
However, courts have not allowed directors to shelter behind the
business judgment rule where directors have acted in bad faith, without
due care, abused their discretion, or participated in a transaction in
which they were interested.46 The rule has been characterized as hav-
ing five elements, which courts generally examined before "second
guessing" the decision of the board.47 The decision must be a business
decision, the board should be disinterested, have acted with due care, in
good faith and even if it satisfies all the other elements, must still not
have abused its discretion.48 Courts have been reluctant to find liability
unless the decision could not be attributed to any rational business pur-
pose, or there was abuse of discretion.49
The burden lay on the person alleging breach of duty to overcome
the presumption of due care, good faith and disinterestedness. 50 Only if
he did, then the burden shifted to the director to show the contrary. In
any event, the plaintiff also had to establish causation and damage.5"
In Florida, even prior to the 1987 amendment, the business judg-
ment rule had been codified as the duty of care provision.5 2 An individ-
ual who performs duties as a director, in good faith and in the best
interests of the corporation, with such care as an ordinarily prudent
person in like position would exercise under similar circumstances, is
relieved from liability.53 However, under this general provision, similar
to that in Delaware and many other states, it was left to the court to
define and apply the phrase "such care as an ordinarily prudent person
in like position".
Florida courts have long relied on Delaware corporate law for
guidance in deciding cases involving corporation law, and "to establish
44. Orlando Orange Groves Co.,. 107 Fla. at 314, 144 So. at 677 (quoting 7
R.C.L. 456, 457).
45. Id., 144 So. at 677.
46. See Radin, supra note 3, at 710.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1461.
50. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
51. See, e.g., id. (Delaware Supreme Court remanding the matter to the trial
court for a hearing to determine the damage sustained).
52. § 607.0830. The Legislature did not change this section in any way after the
1987 amendment.
53. Id.
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their own corporate doctrines. ' 54 In Aronson v. Lewis,5 5 the Delaware
Supreme Court decided that in making a business decision, directors
would be protected by the business judgment rule only in so far as the
decision was informed. Furthermore, the standard for determining
whether the decision was informed was one of "gross negligence. 58
Van Gorkom,57 decided by the Delaware Supreme Court one year
later, "shocked the corporate world" by deciding that the directors of
Trans Union Corporation had been "grossly negligent" in approving a
cash-out merger proposal after a short meeting, and would not be pro-
tected by the business judgment rule.5 8
The board's decision was made at a special board meeting called
by Jerome W. Van Gorkom, Trans Union's Chairman and Chief Exec-
utive Officer, who did not inform the directors of the purpose of the
meeting.5 9 In fact, senior management learned of the proposal approxi-
mately one hour before the meeting."° Apart from Van Gorkom's
twenty minute presentation at the meeting, the directors had no other
substantive information about the merger."' It appears that none of the
directors had read the merger agreement prior to signing.62 The court
held that the directors did not adequately inform themselves as to Van
Gorkom's role in the transaction and as to how he arrived at the deci-
sion to force the sale and set the price of the shares."3 In addition, they
were not informed as to the value of the corporation.64 The court found
the directors "grossly negligent in approving the 'sale' of the Company
upon two hours' consideration, without prior notice, and without the
54. International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1459 n.22.
55. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
56. See, e.g., id. at 812 & n.6; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. Indeed, Florida
courts have long held that directors who acted with gross negligence, causing waste to
the corporation's assets, could not seek shelter behind the business judgment rule; see
Skinner, 103 Fla. at 716, 138 So. at 771 (citations omitted). Since 1985, Florida courts
have extended the standard even further. In Cottle v. Storer Comm., Inc., 849 F.2d
570, 577 (1 1th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals, applying Florida law,
held that the plaintiff must prove gross inadequacy of price in order to overcome the
business judgment rule.
57. 488 A.2d 858.
58. Id. at 874; see also Radin, supra note 3, at 707.
59. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 868-69.
62. See id. at 868 & n.7.
63. Id. at 874.
64. Id.
1991] 1397
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exigency of a crisis or an emergency."65
Many viewed the Van Gorkom decision as the courts having
opened the door to exposing directors to personal liability for their ac-
tions. 6  Based on the facts of the case, the view in the insurance indus-
try and within the business community was that the standard of care
required of a director was now much higher, and indeed almost impos-
sible to achieve. 7
In actions involving monetary damages, the 1987 amendment, in
effect requires the courts to apply the business judgment rule only as a
first step to determine whether a duty has been breached.68 For even if
the director breached a duty, he will not be liable for damages unless
the court finds that the breaching act falls into one of the five
exceptions. 9
D. The Five Exceptions
Under the first exception, the director's breach or failure to per-
form his duty must constitute
[a] violation of the-criminal law, unless the director had reasonable
cause to believe his conduct was lawful or had no reasonable cause
to believe his conduct was unlawful. A judgment or other final ad-
judication against a director in any criminal proceeding for a viola-
tion of the criminal law estops the director from contesting the fact
that his breach or failure to perform, constitutes a violation of the
criminal law; but does not estop him from establishing that he had
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was lawful or had no
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful. 70
This exception does not create new law, because as part of their
duty of care, directors have traditionally had a duty to act lawfully.
According to the ALI Principles of corporate governance, a director
violates his duty of care and good faith if he "knowingly" causes the
corporation to violate the law. 7' To eliminate problems which have
65. Id.
66. See supra note 3.
67. Id.
68. § 607.0831(1)(a).
69. § 607.0831(1)(b).
70. § 607.0831(1)(b)(1).
71. See Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes,
61 TEMP. L. REv. 13, 36 (1988).
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arisen over the interpretation of the word "knowingly," the Florida
Legislature chose instead to define it as "having reasonable cause to
believe. ' 72 Undoubtedly, litigation will still arise as to the meaning of
"reasonable cause," since inevitably, directors will attempt to further
insulate themselves from liability by claiming that they did not believe
that their actions were criminal.
Under the second exception, the director's breach or failure to per-
form must constitute "[a] transaction from which the director derived
an improper personal benefit, either directly or indirectly. 73 The stat-
ute goes on to define an "improper personal benefit." The director is
deemed not to derive an improper personal benefit if: a) the transaction
and the nature of the benefit were not prohibited by federal or state
law;7 4 b) the transaction was known or disclosed to the all directors and
/or shareholders;75 and c) the transaction was fair and reasonable to
the corporation.76 The statute also does not rule out the possibility of
other circumstances under which the benefit may be deemed to be
improper.7
In this second exception the Legislature addressed the director's
duty of loyalty. The exception must be viewed in conjunction with sec-
tion 607.0832, which outlines the standards for directors in situations
where there may be a conflict of interest.7 8 Although, section 607.0832
deals primarily with the enforceability of the contract, it is interesting
to note that it may be possible for the contract to be unenforceable
because of a conflict of interest under section 607.0832, but for the
director not to be liable under section 607.0831(1)(b)(2).
This second exception only alludes to that aspect of the duty which
requires the director to act in the corporation's best interest and to re-
frain from self-interested behavior. Other aspects of the duty of loyalty
such as fraud or bad faith are not addressed in this exception. In addi-
tion, the definition of "improper" does not include a benefit to the di-
rector's family or financial associates.79 Consequently, although this ex-
72. See § 607.0831(1)(b)(1).
73. § 607.0831(1)(b)(2).
74. § 607.831(3).
75. § 607.831(3)(a),(b).
76. § 607.831(3)(c).
77. § 607.0831(5).
78. § 607.0832 does not address the issue of director liability.
79. See Gelb, supra note 71, at 40, for a discussion of the merits of including
members of the director's family and his associates in determining whether he has an
interest in the transaction.
1991] 1399
11
Seuradge: Note: The Personal Liability of Directors in Florida: Whose Corpo
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
ception saves some liability for breach of duty of loyalty, it relieves the
director of much responsibility.
Under the third exception, the director's breach or failure to per-
form must constitute a circumstance whereby the director votes or as-
sents to a distribution of dividends in violation of section 607.06401 or
the articles of incorporation.8 0 The statute merely reiterates the direc-
tor's liability for unlawful distributions which had previously been stat-
utorily established. The intent of the provision is to continue to protect
the creditors of the corporation against directors who may want to re-
ward shareholders for their investments before creditors are satisfied."
1
Under the fourth exception, the director's breach or failure to per-
form must constitute "[i]n a proceeding by or in the right of the corpo-
ration to procure a judgement in its favor or by or in the right of a
shareholder, conscious disregard for the best interest of the corporation,
or wilful misconduct."8 Once more the legislature tried to preserve the
duty of loyalty to some extent. In a-derivative action, this exception
puts the onus on the director to act with good faith. However, the
words "conscious" and "wilful" indicate that the standard of care re-
quired is relatively low and a level of behavior bordering on outra-
geousness is probably what is required for liability to be established.
The fifth and final exception requires that the director's breach or
failure to perform constitute, "in a proceeding by or in the right of
someone other than the corporation or a shareholder, recklessness or an
act or omission which was committed in bad faith or with malicious
purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and wilful disregard of
human rights, safety or property. '8 3 The section goes on to define
"recklessness" as "the action, or omission to act, in conscious disregard
of a risk," and which the director knew or should have known because
it was obvious, would be so great as to probably cause harm. 4 This
exception refers to actions brought by third parties. The standard es-
tablished by the section is even lower than in the previous section.
Criminal intent may have to be established in order to find a director
liable under this exception.
80. § 607.0831(1)(b)(3). § 607.06401 provides the circumstances under which
the board may authorize distributions to shareholders. See FLA. STAT. § 607.0640
(1989) and § 607.08401 (Supp. 1990). The restrictions are mainly out of concern for
creditors. See also Changes, supra note 11, at 702.
81. See Changes, supra note 11, at 702.
82. § 607.0831(1)(b)(4).
83. § 607.0831(1)(b)(5).
84. § 607.0831(2).
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Florida courts have not yet had an opportunity to examine the pro-
visions of the 1987 amendment.85 Indeed, the exceptions require such
exceptional misconduct by directors that it is unlikely that litigation is
forthcoming. However, a re-examination of the Van Gorkom case in
the light of the 1987 amendment is instructive.
Delaware Supreme Court Justice Andrew G.T. Moore, a member
of the Van Gorkom court, stated that the case "doesn't stand for new
law. The court was just applying old law to egregious facts. ' 86 Some
commentators have concluded that "absent egregious conduct," the
court has not changed its traditional application of the business judg-
ment rule's presumption that director's conduct is informed and taken
in good faith." The Delaware court found the board to have been
grossly negligent because it approved a multi-million dollar takeover in
a two hour board meeting without regard to proper reports or investiga-
tion. However, if the action had taken place where current Florida law
was applicable, the directors would have escaped liability because their
actions did not fall into any of the five exceptions.88
The 1987 amendment defines egregious conduct under the five ex-
ceptions, and basically requires the courts to go beyond the business
judgment rule in order to find director liability in circumstances in
which monetary damages are claimed. Apart from these few excep-
tional circumstances, the legislature has limited the power of the courts
to deal with the director who has abused his discretion. The legislature
has also stymied the right of the owners of the corporation to decide
how culpable their directors should be.
III. THE LEGISLATURE'S CONCERNS
In amending the corporation act, the Senate believed that the new
provisions in themselves would give directors an incentive to serve on
boards, since they would serve free from the worry of personal ruin,
85. There are no reported cases which have called upon the courts to determine
whether the action falls within the amendment.
86. Radin, supra note 3, at 719, (citing Victor, Rhetoric is Hot When The Topic
is Takeovers, Legal Times, Dec. 23, 1985, at 7).
87. Id. at 720.
88. In contrast, under present Delaware law, the directors would have escaped
liability only if Trans Union had amended its certificate of incorporation to include a
provision relieving directors of liability. The issue of who controls the votes of share-
holders' which are necessary for an amendment of this nature is beyond the scope of
this article.
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and secure in the knowledge that they would likely be indemnified by
the corporation for any liability which may be determined against
them.89 Further, it anticipated that Florida would benefit as it would
remain an attractive place for corporations to incorporate."
This part reviews the state of the director and officer liability in-
surance industry, particularly from the standpoint of directors. It also
examines whether the indemnification provisions of the corporation act,
together with the 1987 amendment can achieve the legislature's stated
objective.
A. Director and Officer Liability Insurance
It is indisputable that a crisis exists, and has existed since the
early 1980's, in the director and officer insurance industry. 9' The prac-
tice of corporations insuring their directors against personal liability in-
curred for their corporate actions is quickly disappearing.0'2 On the one
hand, premiums have become exorbitant,9 3 and on the other, some in-
surance companies are no longer issuing such policies.94 Corporate di-
rectors must now face the reality of potential personal liability for sim-
ple errors in judgment.
Shareholders derivative claims represent the majority of claims
filed against directors of corporations.95 Indeed there has been an in-
crease in both the number of suits and the severity of such claims.96
Director and officer claims rose at a rate of fifteen to twenty percent
per year over a ten year period from 1977 to 1987."7 Indeed, directors
89. SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 7.
90. Id. This prediction has not been borne out since there has been no significant
increase in the number of corporations being registered in Florida annually.
91. See supra note 1.
92. A corporation may purchase and maintain insurance on a director in respect
of any liability incurred by him. § 607.0850(12).
93. Premiums on director and officer liability policies increased by an average of
506 per cent nationwide in 1986 according to a survey of 256 chairmen of Fortune
1,000 companies by Heidrick & Struggles, a Chicago based executive search firm. See
SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 7.
94. The Department of Insurance identifies nine companies who have rate filings
with the department for director and officer insurance. Of these, at least two had no
writings in Florida in 1986 and others were very selective in their underwriting. See
SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 7-8.
95. Note, Corporate Directors, supra note 3, at 504.
96. Id.
97. Note, New York's Response, supra note 1, at 1307-8.
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of public companies have a one in five chance of being sued.9 8
While ninety percent of the corporations carry director and officer
insurance, one third have seen a rise in premiums of over three hundred
per cent." Premium increases have resulted from large payouts not
only in quantity, but also in size. Over a ten year period, the size of
claims increased, and the percentage of claims with payments of over
one million dollars jumped by seventy three percent.' 00 Insurance carri-
ers are reluctant to provide adequate director and officer liability insur-
ance at any premium. The risk has become too great.10' Policies that
are issued are more restrictive in nature and contain numerous
exclusions.102
Many outside directors0 3 have reevaluated their decisions to serve
on boards, while several have resigned or declined appointment where
the corporation has failed to provide adequate director and officer lia-
bility insurance.10 Three hundred and seventy directors were surveyed
by the National Association of Corporate Directors and their responses
indicated that one in seven would refuse to sit on any board without
insurance protection, and approximately four percent had already re-
signed from boards without director and officer coverage.' 0 5 A 1986
Peat Marwick poll of nearly eight thousand chief executives and direc-
tors in the corporate and not-for-profit sectors showed that the problem
of providing adequate director and officer coverage was damaging the
calibre of management. 06 Six in ten reported that this problem af-
fected the way in which they managed their organizations and forty
three per cent believed that the situation had reached crisis
proportion. 10 7
The corporate legal fiction allows individuals to pool their re-
sources and act as one "person" in conducting commercial activity.
Traditionally management of the corporation rests in a board of direc-
98. SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 8.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Note, New York's Response, supra note 1, at 1308.
101. Block, Barton & Garfield, supra note 1, at 131 & nn.5 & 6.
102. Note, New York's Response, supra note 1, at 1314-15 & n.56.
103. An insider director is one who is also an officer or employee of the corpora-
tion. Conversely, an outside director is not an employee.
104. Note, Corporate Directors, supra note 3, at 505 n.73.
105. SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 8.
106. PEAT MARWICK, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY: A CRISIS IN THE
MAKING 4 (1986).
107. Id.
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tors. s08 However, whereas in the earliest small private corporations the
board was usually made up of the shareholders, 10 9 as corporations grew
in size and became more sophisticated, the composition of the board
also changed. In order for the corporation to be managed properly, the
seats on the board of directors had to be filled by people of reputation,
expertise and specialized knowledge. Even so, the modern view is that
the board cannot effectively "manage" a corporation. 10 The board can
only act in meetings"' and since in practice meetings are held only a
few times a year, the modern board must in effect rely oa the officers
and executives of the corporation. 1 2
Today, the wealth of information that is available on any given
topic, and the speed with which it becomes available can make the di-
rector's job even more onerous. Fear of liability for not accessing and
reading all that is available also acts as a deterrent to busy, yet quali-
fied, persons to serve on corporate boards." 3 The problem corporations
face if they are unable to afford or obtain director and officer insurance
is in recruiting and retaining a high calibre of director. Confronted
with the prospect of risking his financial future for token remuneration,
a former or future director prefers to take the safer course of not serv-
ing on a corporate board. Ultimately, the lack of qualified directors
must create a crisis in the business world. Boards will run less effi-
ciently and certainly, those directors who can be inveigled into taking
108. "All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and
the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of
directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation." FLA. STAT.
§ 607.0801(2). See generally N. LATTIN, LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS, 239-342 (1971)
(discussion of the development of the role of directors in the management of a
corporation).
109. Florida corporate law still reflects this position, as corporations with 35 or
fewer shareholders may provide for no board of directors or may limit the power of the
board if it has one. § 607.0801(3).
110. See, e.g., Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability, supra note 3, at 415
n.26.
111. Section 607.0824(3) provides that a vote of the majority taken at a meeting
of directors at which a quorum is present, is the act of the board of directors. Directors
can act without a meeting only if the action is taken by all the directors. § 607.0821.
112. See, e.g., Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability, supra note 3, at 415
n.26.
113. In discharging his duties, a director may rely on "information, opinions,
reports, or statements, including financial statements" which has been prepared by
competent employees or officers, experts, accountants, legal counsel and/or committees
of the board of which he may not be a member. § 607.0830(2). See also supra Part II.
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the positions will act with extreme caution.114 Directors will be less in-
clined to take business risks if their personal assets are at stake. Indedd,
"the opportunities for 'innovation and creative activities' may be
lost.""1 5
In the light of the foregoing and in order to provide greater protec-
tion for directors than the courts are willing to give, in recent years,
more than thirty-five states have amended their corporation acts.1 6
Most states have taken one of three approaches: 1) the "charter op-
tion" approach 2) the "cap on money damages" approach, and 3) the
"self-executing" approach. 117
Delaware was the first state to enact the "charter option" ap-
proach in 1986. This approach allows the shareholders, with some ex-
ceptions, to decide whether to adopt a provision in the corporation's
charter which eliminates or limits the personal liability of a director for
money damages. 118 Several other states have followed Delaware's lead
in adopting this approach. 9
The "cap on money damages" approach limits, with some excep-
tions, the amount of money damages for which a director may be lia-
ble.120 The statute would provide a maximum figure beyond which lia-
bility could not extend.1 2'
The "self-executing" approach, as the name implies, means that
the standard of liability is determined by the statute itself. 2 2 Share-
holders have no input into whether liability for monetary damages
should attach to their directors in circumstances other than those pre-
scribed by the statute.1 23
The Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Associa-
tion recommends that shareholders should be allowed to decide whether
114. Block, Barton & Garfield, supra note 1, at 131-2.
115. Note, New York's Response, supra note 1, at 1317 (citing Schwartz, In
Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of Professors Fischel and
Bradley, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 322, 323 (1986).
116. See Changes, supra note 11, at 696.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 696-97.
120. Id. at 698; see also Titus, supra note 3, at 4 n.7 for a discussion concerning
the states which followed the Delaware approach.
121. See Titus, supra note 3, at 5. Virginia has placed the cap at $100,000 or the
amount of compensation in cash which the director received in the twelve months im-
mediately preceding the act. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(2).
122. Changes, supra note 11, at 698.
123. See id.
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to eliminate liability of directors for their conduct, unless "important
societal values are at stake."' 24 The Committee therefore recommends
that the Model Business Act should adopt the charter option
approach.12
5
The Florida Legislature chose the self executing approach. 2 ' Al-
though Florida directors, like directors in every other jurisdiction, owe
the corporations they serve and shareholders the fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty, they are now statutorily protected regarding decisions
they make as directors. As explained in the previous part, a director's
liability for monetary damages is completely eliminated unless the ac-
tion is one which falls into one of the five exceptions. The Florida ap-
proach is by far the most radical approach since it eliminates the tradi-
tional right of shareholders to decide the manner in which the
corporation they own should be run. Taking decision making out of the
hands of the shareholder and into the hands of the state is a dangerous
precedent and violates the very essence of capitalism.
B. Indemnification Provisions
In addition, in keeping with its decision to give directors as much
protection as possible, the Legislature also amended the indemnifica-
tion provisions in 1987 to increase the circumstances under which a
director may be indemnified by the corporation. Three major changes
were effected. The first two concern derivative actions. Directors are
now entitled to be indemnified for expenses incurred in derivative ac-
tions which have been a) settled; and b) in which they have been found
liable, if a court of competent jurisdiction determines that it is fair and
reasonable so to do. 2' The third major change was in determining
under what circumstances and to what extent the corporation will in-
demnify a director. The corporation may not indemnify a director
whose action constituted one of the exceptions under section
607.0831.128
The present position is that indemnification is available under the
statute in four operative categories. 129 The first is that prior to the
124. Id. at 700.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 13, for other states adopting the Florida approach.
127. § 607.0850(2).
128. § 607.0850(7).
129. Fields, Indemnification of Officers and Directors Under Revised Florida
Statute, in RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, OFFICERS
1406 [Vol. 15
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/15
Seuradge
event, the corporation may decide in what circumstances indemnifica-
tion is allowed by adopting by-laws and executing agreements.1 30 Sec-
ond, after the event, the corporation may elect to indemnify the direc-
tor, except that it may not indemnify the director in respect of actions
which fall under one of four of the five exceptions under section
607.0831.131 Furthermore, the statute distinguishes between indemnifi-
cation in derivative and non-derivative actions.13 2 Third, a director who
successfully defends a suit is unconditionally entitled to expenses to the
extent of his success.' Finally, a new addition provides that a court of
competent jurisdiction may order indemnification even if the director
has been unsuccessful, but only if it is fair and reasonable in the
circumstances. 3 4
The new additions to the statute provide an incentive to directors
to settle cases without fear of paying their own out of pocket ex-
penses.' 35 However, it is difficult to rationalize why the corporation
should reimburse a director for actions he has taken to hurt the corpo-
ration in an action brought against him on behalf of the corporation. 3 6
The policy reasons for adopting such a provision could be only to make
the position of director more attractive and to insulate directors further
from financial loss as a result of their office.
Viewed in conjunction with the director liability statute, indemnifi-
cation for expenses is not available if the act constitutes four of the five
exceptions. Consequently in an action for money damages which is set-
tled or in which the director is found liable, he may not be reimbursed
unless the act falls into the fifth exception - that the director acted
recklessly, in bad faith or in a manner exhibiting wanton disregard for
life and human safety. 137 In effect the Legislature has made indemnifi-
AND ATTORNEYS, 2.1, 2.4 (1987).
130. § 607.0850(7).
131. Id.
132. A director may be indemnified for liability in respect of actions not brought
on behalf of the corporation (i.e. non-derivative actions) under § 607.0850(1). In re-
spect of derivative actions, the director may be indemnified in respect of expenses and,
as amended in 1987, sums paid in settlement not exceeding what it would have cost to
litigate the action under § 607.0850(2). See Fields, supra note 129, at 2.5-2.6, for a
lengthy discussion.
133. § 607.0850(3).
134. § 607.0850(2).
135. See Fields, supra note 129, at 2.6.
136. Id.
137. § 607.0831(b)(5).
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cation possible in circumstances in which the director should be most
culpable. Such a result defies logic, leaving one to conclude that leaving
out the fifth exception must have been an oversight by the Legislature.
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to the 1987 amendment, directors in Florida were not ex-
posed to liability for monetary damages unless they breached their du-
ties to the corporation."3 8 Shareholders had some measure of assurance
that the directors would act responsibly in making deci;ions on their
behalf, or at least be legally accountable to shareholders for their ac-
tions. The 1987 amendment in addition to giving little protection to the
shareholder, also does not achieve its stated legislative goal of making
the position of director more attractive.'39
Moreover, the predictions of dire consequences to corporate direc-
tors arising out of Van Gorkom have not materialized, nor have the
fears that the courts would lower the standard of culpability for direc-
tors.14 One author's examination of case law in the three years follow-
ing Van Gorkom has found that "the courts have repeatedly rejected
due care allegations in cases in which the challenged board conduct did
not approach the level of gross negligence present in Van Gorkom. ' "'1
The study concluded that only six courts found violations of due care
within the period, and in all the cases, the conduct approached the level
of conduct in the Van Gorkom case.' 42 The author concluded that the
decisions showed no indication of "a change in the courts' traditional
"1143adherence to the business judgment rule's presumption ....
Of particular interest, and perhaps warning, to Florida directors is
that in all six cases the parties requested and the court granted injunc-
tive relief after having found a lack of due care.14 4 The 1987 amend-
ment did not address the question of injunctive relief, so director liabil-
ity in that arena remains a question to be determined by consideration
of the business judgment rule. However, a plaintiff shareholder will
have to anticipate board action in order to stop it by injunction, and in
138. See supra Part II.
139. Id.
140. Radin, supra note 3, at 720.
141. Id. at 720, 754 & n.359.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 755.
144. Injunctive relief may have been the only relief available because of the leg-
islative responses to the Van Gorkom decision.
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order to get rescission must prove that the action was so grossly unfair
that it should not be allowed to stand. Ultimately, "as a practical mat-
ter the lack of a monetary damage remedy may deprive stockholders or
the corporation of an effective remedy when the stockholder is unaware
of director action until it is completed."14
An important question not considered by the Florida Legislature
was the effect that the amendment had on the rights of shareholders.
Incorporation allows investors to pool their resources into one business
entity which hopefully will result in greater returns for the individual in
the long run. In exchange for limited liability, the shareholder gives up
participation in the everyday running of the business to the board of
directors. The fiduciary duties were imposed by the courts to honor the
trust and confidence placed in the directors by the shareholders. 46 The
1987 amendment effectively says to the shareholder in a Florida corpo-
ration that a director may mismanage the corporation without any fear
of sanction except in the most reprehensible circumstances. Directors
may be encouraged to act negligently or even with gross negligence if
there is no fear of legal penalty. 147 While the 1987 amendment pro-
vides protection for the director, it virtually leaves the shareholder out
in the cold. t48
Prior to the 1987 amendment, approximately 90,000 organizations
were incorporated annually in Florida. 49 The statistics presently avail-
able for 1990 indicate that as of November 1990, less than 80,000 in-
corporations had been filed. 50 Although one may argue that the econ-
omy may have had a negative effect on incorporations in Florida,
undoubtedly the stated goal of making Florida a more attractive place
to incorporate has not come to pass.
An interesting view is that the amendment may affect the cost of
145. Gelb, supra note 71, at 32.
146. See Note, Corporate Directors, supra note 3, at 497 n. 11.
147. See id. at 513 for a discussion regarding the anticipated reaction of direc-
tors when faced with no legal penalty for their actions.
148. It may be argued that if shareholders can act in time and get past the
procedural hurdles, they are not precluded from seeking injunctive relief against a
board's decision; or that the shareholders may replace unsatisfactory directors by initi-
ating proxy contests. See Titus, supra note 3, at 17. However, proxy contests are ex-
ceedingly expensive and there is no evidence that the price of shares has any effect on
the behavior of directors.' See id. at n.52.
149. SENATE ANALYSIS, supra note 19, at 8.
150. Statistics given over the telephone from the Division of Corporations.
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director and officer insurance by causing rates to fall substantially.' 5'
The view is based on the theory that insurance premiums are based on
the degree of risk, and that the degree of risk is significantly lowered
because of the heightened culpability standard. 52 Consequently, it is
argued, once the insurance industry recognizes the reduced risk, premi-
ums should also fall. 53 While it is true that the position of director has
been made more attractive, whether the amendment has a positive ef-
fect on insurance rates will ultimately determine its success viz-a-viz
the stated legislative goal." Furthermore, diluting the voice of share-
holders in organizations in which they place their financial well being,
while at the same time giving directors free reign, may have negative
social and economic effects.
Finally, perhaps if insurance rates fall and the courts interpret the
legislation in a manner which favors directors, the "radical" changes in
the act may eventually have some "positive" effect on the law or the
corporate arena in Florida. However, when weighed against the known
effect of diluting the voice of the shareholder in the corporation in
which he owns and invests his money by reducing the circumstances in
which he may obtain redress for misconduct and mismangement by his
fiduciaries, the net effect cannot be positive. Indeed, the actions of the
legislature prompts one to ask "whose corporation is it anyway?"
Riah Ramlogan Seuradge
151. Note, New York's Response, supra note 1, at 1350 n.275.
152. Id. (citing J. MARKS, SHARING THE RISK 109 (1981)).
153. Id. at 1350 n.275. In Florida, although data is currently unavailable to de-
termine whether premiums have fallen, statistics from the Supervisor of Insurance indi-
cate that the sums paid out in claims for director and officer liability has fallen signifi-
cantly since 1987.
154. Supra Part II.
1410 [Vol. 15
22
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/15
